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Three Thoughts Concerning
"JustLinkage"
Daniel Markovitst
Comment on Sanjay Reddy and Christian Barry's Interna-

tional Trade and Labor Standards: A Proposalfor Linkage
Thanks very much to the organizers for arranging this conference, and
thanks to all of you for giving up your Saturday afternoon to participate.
Let me start by saying straightforwardly that I have no settled view about
whether linking international trade and domestic labor standards is a good
idea or not, all-things-considered, or indeed about whether it is practically
feasible or not. Instead of making an argument for or against the BarryReddy proposal for just linkage, I confine myself to identifying what I take
to be three important respects in which the proposal invites further
thought, some of which have been identified earlier and some of which
have not. I will also try to draw out some connections between this propo-

sal and what has been said earlier today, especially by Richard Miller in his
remarks concerning global institutional reform.
The first feature of just linkage that I want to take up is that it privileges work as a site of general distributive claims. It is not obvious that this
is the right way to proceed.
To be sure, there exist certain kinds of distributive claims that are naturally and even necessarily associated with work conditions. An example
is the claim not to be enslaved: it is difficult to imagine how one could
respect someone's right not to be a slave except by restricting the way in
which those for whom she works may treat her. Moreover, other (less dra-

matic) distributive claims may also be inextricably tied to work. I am
thinking, in particular, of rights to organize in conjunction with other
workers, especially insofar as these rights importantly include rights to
engage in collective bargaining with capital, rather than simply to band
together in workers' political parties. These types of claims, to the extent
that they are appealing, will naturally and necessarily privilege work as a
site of distributive justice for the worst off, or at least for some of the worst

off.
But there are all sorts of other ways in which the Barry-Reddy proposal

for just linkage privileges work as a site of distributive justice-including, in
particular, by insisting on minimum wages (perhaps including fringe benefits) and maximum hours. And the basic distributive claims that these prof
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posals answer - claims to a certain material standard of living and to a life
outside of work (including, but not limited to, adequate opportunities for
leisure) - may also be addressed in ways that are unconnected to the
employment relationship. A simple alternative, which I offer not as the
best policy but just as an example to help fix ideas, is to provide for the
worst off through entitlement programs, or even cash disbursements,
which apply even to those who cannot get work. This alternative supplements wages rather than mandating higher wages; it allows the terms of
employment to be fixed by market mechanisms (although these now operate against a backdrop of greater security for workers). There are, of
course, many variations on this proposal, which differ along principled
and not just practical lines. Once again, the little that I've said here is by
way of illustration only.
Such possibilities make it natural to ask whether it is for the best, allthings-considered, that distributive claims (at least, those that may be
answered either in connection with or apart from work) should be
addressed using policies that operate through the employment relation.
(This question may, of course, be asked in a domestic as well as in an
international context.) I have no fixed view about the answer to this question, which would surely distinguish among varieties of work-independent
redistributive programs that I have lumped together. I raise the issue not to
stake out a position, but only because Barry and Reddy's argument would
benefit from taking up the question more extensively and above all more
explicitly than it now does.
In particular, Barry and Reddy equivocate about whether the goal
from which they set out is to improve the condition of the less advantaged
tout court or, instead, to improve more narrowly the condition of less
advantaged workers. This ambiguity in the way in which the manuscript
currently frames its ambition threatens to disguise the choice between
work-dependent and work-independent redistribution. In so doing, it may
make the case for just linkage appear stronger than it perhaps is.
The former goal - of improving the lives of all the global poor - is
more obviously compelling and therefore fits most naturally with Barry
and Reddy's self-proclaimed desire to proceed from uncontroversial foundations. But this goal is not necessarily best served by Barry and Reddy's
proposal for just linkage. To begin with, the emphasis on fair terms of
work leaves out those who have and can get no work, and this may distort
global distributive justice away from some of the most deserving. Moreover, just linkage introduces unnecessary economic inefficiencies into redistribution even in favor of those who can get work. The connection that it
imposes between redistribution and working inefficiently distorts, in a way
that work-independent redistribution might avoid, the choice between market labor on the one hand and subsistence production or leisure on the
other. (Here it does not help that the Barry-Reddy proposal would condition access to international markets on fair labor practices in all sectors of
the economy, including in production for domestic consumption, and not
just for export. The distortion at issue is not between classes of market
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production but rather between all types of market production and other
activities.)
By contrast, the latter goal - of improving the lives specifically of the
employed global poor - may more easily be connected to Barry and
Reddy's emphasis on labor standards. But this goal is perhaps less uncontroversial than Barry and Reddy would wish it to be. Although a distributive preference for workers over non-workers may be defensible, either on
the ground that the workers are, in principle, more deserving or on the
ground that they are, in practice, easier to aid, that defense will inevitably
be controversial. Barry and Reddy do not provide it and, moreover, wish to
avoid the types of controversy that such a defense would necessarily
involve. The connection that just linkage draws between work and distributive justice is, therefore, the first respect in which the Barry-Reddy proposal invites further argument.
The second feature of the Barry-Reddy proposal on which I want to
comment is that it enforces work-related distributive claims through trade
policy. This enforcement mechanism raises a host of familiar questions,
many of which have been identified either in the paper or in today's discussion, but which seem worth briefly re-emphasizing, perhaps in order to
encourage Barry and Reddy to address them somewhat more directly than
they have done so far.
At some moments, Barry and Reddy seem to think it natural that labor
standards should be enforced though market access, and even suggest that
their proposal for just linkage proceeds by an analogy to domestic policies
that use access to domestic markets as one of the ways of enforcing workrelated distributive ideals. But it seems to me that direct command and
control is a much more important enforcement mechanism in the domestic
context. The principal sanction against abusive domestic employers is not
that their goods are prevented from being sold, but rather that something
else is done to them: they're fined; they're enjoined; they're subject to criminal prosecution.
Moreover, although enforcement mechanisms that do not go through
trade obviously raise complications in the international context that have
no domestic analogs, these mechanisms remain available, both in principle
and (although perhaps to a lesser extent) in practice. Most extremely (and
as a direct analogy to domestic command and control), individual states or
international organizations might force other states to respect fair labor
standards, including perhaps even by military intervention against states
that, say, support or permit slavery. Moreover, there are much, much more
modest alternatives to the trade-sanction-based regime that Barry and
Reddy propose. One especially modest proposal, which lies at the opposite
extreme from military intervention, would offer substantial direct development aid for states that do impose fair labor standards, perhaps even aid
that directly subsidizes these standards.
I mention these alternatives not to defend them but only to emphasize
that the "linkage" part of the Barry-Reddy proposal stands as much in need
of a defense as the "justice" part and to point out that the domestic enforce-
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ment of labor standards provides grounds for skepticism rather than
enthusiasm about linkage. Barry and Reddy are, of course, aware of this,
and their manuscript does address some alternatives to linkage, but it
seems to me that there is again room for a more explicit argument here.
The third feature of the Barry-Reddy proposal on which I will comment is the suggestion that the labor standards and trade sanctions that
constitute the substance of just linkage should be applied and administered specifically through a global institution rather than being promoted
in some other way. The institutional solution that Barry and Reddy prefer
is in many respects the most complicated feature of their proposal, and the
complications that it involves are directly related to some themes in the
paper that Richard Miller presented this morning.
To be sure, the most prominent (or at least the most powerful) skeptics
concerning international institutions today are skeptical because they
reject the egalitarian and internationalist aims that such institutions (at
least on Barry and Reddy's model) pursue. That position is not interesting
in the present context, however, because it opposes the Barry-Reddy proposal entirely, rather than just in its institutional component. But narrower
objections focusing specifically on the institutional aspect of Barry and
Reddy's proposal are also available: it is possible for someone who is sympathetic to Barry and Reddy's work-centered account of global distributive
justice, and who accepts their contention that international trade mechanisms are the best way to promote distributive justice so understood, to be
skeptical, nevertheless, of the idea that a global institution should make the
connection. Most naturally, such a sympathetic skeptic may doubt
whether the institutional approach that Barry and Reddy propose presents
a feasible mechanism for achieving just linkage. Such a person might
think just linkage is more effectively promoted by bilateral (or even multilateral) treaties, unilateral sanctions, or even social movements (such as
consumer boycotts or the adoption by businesses of the Sullivan
principles).
Barry and Reddy are, of course, aware of concerns about the feasibility
of their institutional proposal for implementing just linkage, and they have
taken up such concerns in some detail in their manuscript and in their
presentation today. In particular, Barry and Reddy address two versions of
the problem of feasibility: first, that institutional enforcement faces strategic obstacles that render it unstable even among nations that severally support just linkage; and second, that the existing international power
structure enables nations that oppose just linkage to block or delay the
creation of the institutions that they contemplate, or to raise the opportunity costs of establishing these institutions so high that reformist resources
would be better devoted elsewhere. Both possibilities are important, but I
have little to add to Barry and Reddy's arguments in this connection and so
do not pursue them here.
Instead, I'll conclude my remarks by taking up another sense in which
Barry and Reddy's institutional approach to enforcing just linkage might
be infeasible. This is the concern that, even if the global institution that
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Barry and Reddy contemplate can be created, it will inevitably be distorted
and manipulated by powerful nations whose self-interest is opposed to just
linkage, frustrating its original objectives. This is just an application of the
broader skepticism concerning international institutions that Richard
Miller expressed in his paper this morning; namely, that in the context of
the extreme concentration of economic and military power in the world
today, international institutions are unable to control exploitation by the
rich and powerful and inevitably become tools of such exploitation. These
institutions don't simply fail to promote justice but rather actively
encourage injustice.
Barry and Reddy, moreover, are clearly aware of the possibility that
the institution through which they propose to enforce just linkage may be
hijacked for non-egalitarian purposes, specifically in the service of protectionism among the developed nations, but they remain, nevertheless,
attracted to an institutional approach. The Barry-Reddy proposal, therefore, stands in sharp disagreement with Miller's argument, and the disagreement presents an opportunity for revisiting broader questions
concerning the relationship between global justice and global institutions
that constitute one of this conference's leading themes.
The tension between the Barry-Reddy proposal for institutionalizing
just linkage and Miller's approach to international institutions can be elaborated in two very different ways. One has to do with the recent history of,
and concrete reality regarding, labor standards and international trade.
How much power does the American hegemon in fact possess just now?
What are the American hegemon's domestic interests concerning labor
standards in the developing world? And to what extent is the American
hegemon inclined to use its power to manipulate institutions in the service
of its interests specifically in this context? These are important questions,
to be sure, but I have nothing particularly intelligent to say about them.
Moreover, Miller's argument, at least, proceeds in a generalist modality that
such narrow, case-specific considerations cannot capture. For both reasons, I'll set aside micro-level skepticism about institutionalizing just
linkage and instead focus on an alternative systematic and structural
account of the tension between Miller's skepticism about international
institutions and the institutional approach to just linkage that Barry and
Reddy prefer. This tension involves the general relationship between, on
the one hand, institutional structures and the formal rules that they establish and, on the other hand, the substantive interests that are pursued and
regulated through these institutions and under these rules.
Miller's paper takes an extremely skeptical, realist view of the ability of
institutions and systems of institutional rules to constrain and cabin substantial interests of powerful parties. The thought that animates the paper,
at least as I understand it, is that institutions, and the procedures that govern them, have no independent ability to constrain the exercise of power,
except insofar as they are themselves independently endowed with power.
Accordingly, because wealth and power are today concentrated (unequally)
in nations, so that global institutions have no free-standing power of their
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own, global institutions cannot constrain rich and powerful nations.
Indeed, and to the contrary, global institutions provide frames in which to
organize, focus, and magnify existing national power. Their existence,
therefore, has the opposite consequence of allowing rich nations to pursue
their purposes more completely and effectively than they could do in the
absence of global institutions.
Although such realism has its merits, it is only part of the truth and
must be balanced against an alternative and more optimistic conception of
the way in which even powerless institutions and systems of rules function.
This alternative conception emphasizes that good-faith and consistency (in
the sense of deciding like cases alike) are naturally appealing to persons
whose moral psychology inclines them to support efforts to apply general
principles to particular cases in an orderly and uniform manner. (One has
to be careful here about how naturalistic one wants the argument to be,
although there is a long and deep vein of naturalism in the philosophical
tradition on this point, culminating in Rawls's idea that one of the two
basic powers of human moral personality is the capacity to cooperate reasonably with others to support fair practices.) And, speaking loosely, one
might say that when this moral psychology is applied to an institutional
context, it exerts a defeasible but nevertheless potent free-standing pressure against exceptionalism, which can even constrain the self-serving conduct of the powerful. Indeed, there is even reason to think that these
institutional affinities are the principal grounds of such other-regarding
inclinations as persons have or likely can develop, so that even the most
idealistic social movements, if they are never crystallized into an institutional form, cannot over the long run provide much service to the poor and
powerless.
One way in which international institutions can function to constrain
conduct, even in the shadow of extreme inequalities in wealth and power
and even without recourse to coercive power of their own, is by engaging
these tendencies in human moral and practical personality and crystallizing them into particular forms. Institutions require even the powerful to
frame the pursuit of their interests in terms of the operation of general
rules. And these general rules (even when they are initially chosen to suit
the powerful) take on lives of their own that - because even the powerful
find it difficult barefacedly to reject rules that they have previously
endorsed - constrain the powerful later in the course of these institutions'
development. Moreover, the free-standing authority associated with the
internal logic of institutional rule-making may also be given a much more
concrete expression. It inheres, for example, in the professional ideology
of the officials who administer institutions, who (whatever their initial
motives) inevitably come to develop some measure of allegiance to the
institutions that they occupy and to these institutions' rules, and not just to
the constituencies on whose behalves they initially entered the institutions.
Indeed, the professional ideology of institutional officials may even bleed
out of the institutions that sustain it and into general practical life. A
domestic example is the way in which procedural values associated with
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the professional ideology of lawyers and judges have come to influence
political morality more broadly. And an international example, highly relevant to the proposal for institutionalizing just linkage that is currently on
the table, is the way in which the ideology of the international civil service
establishes itself in domestic politics, either through the formal domestic
adoption of international legal norms or simply through the overlap and
interchange among international and domestic elites. The Barry-Reddy
proposal would, to my mind at least, benefit from engaging these arguments and elaborating their application specifically to just linkage, in order
to defuse skepticism concerning institutions of the sort that Miller articulated earlier today.
Indeed, Barry and Reddy might go further still in promoting their
institutional approach to just linkage, to argue not just that international
institutions are compatible in practice with achieving a more just distribution of resources, but that they are in some deeper theoretical sense necessary in order for claims of international distributive justice (including
those concerning just linkage) to take hold. On the one hand, the opening
that our practical personalities give to rule-governed conduct and institutional authority may be the best hope for triggering a willingness, among
the inhabitants of rich and powerful nations, to sacrifice their narrow
national interests in the service of global justice. (Certainly, familiar theories concerning the morally educative function of markets, for example, or
of the common law, suggest that people are drawn into concerns for
domestic justice in precisely this way.) And on the other hand, a powerful
line of thought (again associated with Rawls) proposes that, in contradistinction to humanitarian claims, claims of justice apply only in the shadow
of the authority-relations associated with rule-governed, institutional social
organization (and, in particular, in the domestic context, with the state).
Insofar as this is right, the creation of international institutions may serve
not just to promote a more just international distribution of resources but
also to underwrite the claims of justice that this distribution answers.
These possibilities suggest a final reason for which Barry and Reddy might
profitably connect the expressly institutional character of their proposal
for just linkage to the underlying philosophical questions concerning international justice that their proposal sets out to address.

